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ABDULLAHI V. PFIZER & THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: 
KICKING OPEN A DOOR LEFT SLIGHTLY AJAR BY 
SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, northern Nigeria was plagued by a bacterial meningitis 
epidemic.1  One of the main treatment sites was the Infectious Disease 
Hospital (IDH) in Kano, Nigeria.2  There, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors 
Without Borders) had been providing patients with “a conventional and 
effective treatment . . . free of charge.”3  Around the same time, 
pharmaceutical giant Pfizer was seeking the Food & Drug Administration’s 
(FDA) approval for Trovafloxacin Mesylate (commonly known as “Trovan”), 
a new antibiotic designed to fight bacterial meningitis in children.4  In order 
to obtain the clinical data required by the FDA, Pfizer put together a 
research protocol and allegedly received permission from the Nigerian 
government to conduct trials in Kano.5  The company sent three of its 
American doctors into the region to work with four Nigerian doctors.6  
“[T]he team allegedly recruited two hundred sick children who sought 
treatment at the IDH” for the Trovan trial.7  Of the two hundred, 
approximately half were given an oral form of Trovan and half were given 
an FDA-approved drug called Ceftriaxone.8  The Pfizer team concluded the 
trial after two weeks and “left without administering follow-up care.”9  
Eventually, Trovan was approved only for use in “adult emergency care” in 
the United States and was banned entirely in the European Union.10 
Following the Trovan experiment, two sets of Nigerian plaintiffs (the 
Abdullahi plaintiffs and the Adamu plaintiffs)11 filed actions in the Southern 
 
 1. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied mem., 130 
S. Ct. 3541 (2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 169-70. 
 4. Id. at 169. 
 5. Id. at 170. 
 6. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 169. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 169, 170 n.2. 
 9. Id. at 169. 
 10. Id. at 170. 
 11. The procedural history surrounding this preliminary litigation will be discussed more 
fully in Part III, infra. 
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District of New York, claiming, inter alia, violations of a customary 
international law norm against non-consensual medical experimentation.12  
According to the plaintiffs, the trial failed to meet any minimum human 
research standard.13  Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged that Trovan 
had never been tested in oral form on children, that animal tests had shown 
life-threatening side effects, that the children in the Ceftriaxone “control 
group” were purposely given a low dosage to overvalue the effectiveness of 
Trovan, that the team failed to secure the informed consent of the children 
and their parents, and that no follow-up care was administered.14  In their 
complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that five children’s deaths were caused by 
Trovan, six children died from the inadequate dose of Ceftriaxone, and 
numerous others were left with permanent side effects such as paralysis, 
brain damage, and blindness.15  The District Court dismissed both 
complaints in 2002, citing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).16  The plaintiffs made a consolidated appeal—
Abdullahi v. Pfizer—to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.17 
In January of 2009, the Second Circuit handed down its long-awaited 
decision on the case, holding that Pfizer’s Trovan clinical trials violated a 
universally accepted norm of customary international law and thus afforded 
the plaintiffs subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.18  In a 2-1 decision, 
the court looked at a variety of international declarations to find that non-
consensual clinical research falls under the “law of nations.”19  The court 
 
 12. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 168. 
 13. Id. at 169-70 (arguing that minimum research standards were not met when Pfizer 
failed to secure informed consent or follow basic treatment protocols). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 169. 
 16. Id. at 168, 170 (The actions were also dismissed on the alternative grounds of forum 
non conveniens. Although not the focus of this Note, the forum non conveniens aspect is 
important in that it helped to keep the Abdullahi litigation alive long enough to see the 
Supreme Court decide the landmark ATS case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 
(2004).  The preliminary Abdullahi litigation, including the forum non conveniens aspect, will 
be discussed fully in Part III, infra.).  See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).  The statute is 
officially titled “Alien’s action for tort,” but it is commonly referred to as the “Alien Tort Statute” 
or “Alien Tort Claims Act.”  In light of a sharp curtailing of ATS causes of action, for the 
purposes of this Note, “Alien Tort Statute” will be used. 
 17. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 168, 171.  For clarity, this Note will periodically use “the 
2009 decision” to refer to this case and distinguish it from any of the previous actions of the 
same title. 
 18. Id. at 187. 
 19. Id. at 166-68, 175-87. 
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also held that the plaintiffs had alleged facts adequate to show that Pfizer 
was a state actor, working in concert with the Nigerian government.20 
This Note will examine the Second Circuit’s application of the ATS to 
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, focusing both on how the Court defined the “law of 
nations” and how it performed the state action analysis to reach its ultimate 
decision that jurisdiction was appropriate under the ATS.  First, Part II briefly 
introduces the ATS’s “law of nations” component as well as the state action 
consideration.  Then, it discusses the background of the ATS, focusing on its 
application by the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.  Next, Part III examines the preliminary 
litigation leading up to the 2009 decision.  Part IV examines the 2009 
Abdullahi decision, specifically (1) the sources relied upon by the court to 
prove that nonconsensual clinical research is the “law of nations” and (2) 
the majority’s and dissent’s characterization of Pfizer’s relationship with the 
Nigerian government.  Part V looks at the law of nations and the state 
action component in greater detail in order to provide an overall critique of 
the 2009 Abdullahi decision.  Ultimately, this Note will demonstrate that the 
Abdullahi majority disregarded Sosa by its overly broad interpretation and 
application of the ATS and that future restraint must be exercised to prevent 
an ill-advised and problematic expansion of the ATS. 
II.  SUBSTANCE AND HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
A. Substance of the Alien Tort Statute 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS)21 states that “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”22  The 
necessary elements can be broken down as: (1) an alien must bring the suit; 
(2) there must be a cognizable tort cause of action; and (3) the alleged 
action must violate either: (a) the “law of nations”;23 or (b) a treaty of the 
United States.24  In virtually any facially non-frivolous ATS action, the first 
two elements will be satisfied.  Because it can be determined plainly whether 
 
 20. Id. at 188-89.  The court did not address the issue of whether corporate liability exists 
under the ATS, instead viewing Pfizer as an “individual.”  As such, this Note will examine only 
the private versus state actor distinction and disregard the admittedly important corporate 
versus individual liability component.  For a brief discussion of the Second Circuit’s current 
view of corporate liability under the ATS, see infra note 328. 
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 22. Id. 
 23. “Law of nations” and “customary international law” are synonymous terms.  Flores v. 
Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2003).  They will be used 
interchangeably in this Note. 
 24. Id. at 242. 
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an action violates a treaty of the United States, the existence of ATS 
jurisdiction almost inevitably turns on whether the action violates the law of 
nations.  Plaintiffs generally advance a variety of international accords and 
instruments to prove the state of the law of nations and demonstrate that the 
tort alleged violates a customary norm of international law.25 
Inherent in the law of nations analysis is a state action consideration; 
whether one is violating the law of nations will depend on whether that 
person or entity is a private or state actor.26  Many sources of international 
law explicitly apply to states only27 and, as a general rule, the list of law of 
nations violations for which a private actor can be held liable is much 
narrower.28 
In examining ATS jurisprudence as a whole, and particularly the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, it is important to keep in mind the 
uncertain and debatable nature of the law of nations, as well as the 
indivorcible state action question. 
B. History of the Alien Tort Statute 
The history of the ATS reveals judicial uncertainty as to its intended 
scope and application, particularly with respect to the aforementioned law 
of nations inquiry.29  A part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,30 the ATS had—
until 1980—been mentioned in just four judicial opinions31 and provided 
jurisdiction in only two.32 
 
 25. See, e.g., Part II.B infra (discussing the facts of a number of Second Circuit ATS cases, 
as well as the Supreme Court’s Sosa opinion.  In each, the plaintiffs offer several purported 
sources of international law to bolster their claims.). 
 26. See, e.g., Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 194 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (stating that “a 
customary international law norm cannot be divorced from the identity of its violator.”); Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (observing in note 20 that “[A] related 
consideration [to whether a norm can support a cause of action] is whether international law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if 
the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”). 
 27. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
U.N. Doc. A/6546 (Dec. 16, 1966) (which applies only to State parties). 
 28. See infra Part V.B (discussing the differences between a state party’s and a private 
party’s liability with respect to violations of customary norms of international law). 
 29. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing past Second Circuit cases dealing with the ATS). 
 30. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1350). 
 31. Lucien J. Dhooge, Lohengrin Revealed: The Implications of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
for Human Rights Litigation Pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 393, 400 (2006). 
 32. See Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 771 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing the two pre-
1980 cases in which the ATS had provided jurisdiction). 
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The ATS’s scarcity of precedent, coupled with its relative lack of 
legislative history33 has caused courts confusion as to the intended scope of 
the statute.34  In particular, there has been controversy as to whether it is 
purely jurisdictional in nature and as to what constitutes the “law of 
nations.”35  The two questions are tightly entwined; on its face, a dynamic 
view of the “law of nations” language seems to provide for new causes of 
action and give the statute substantive authority.36  A static view would 
appear to make the statute purely jurisdictional in nature,37 confining it to 
violations of the law of nations that existed in 1789.38  Underlying this 
debate is a difficult paradox—in order for federal jurisdiction to even exist 
under the ATS, the complainant must sufficiently plead “a violation of the 
law of nations.”39  The Second Circuit40 has wrestled with this dilemma in 
 
 33. Dhooge, supra note 31, at 397-98.  The Act’s scant legislative history will be evident 
in Part II.B.2 infra, in the context of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 34. Dhooge, supra note 31, at 398.  See also Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. 
Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245, 249 
(2004) (noting that courts have interpreted the scope of the statute so broadly that the door is 
open for countless claims that “[a]lthough potentially meritless . . . are not ‘frivolous’ . . . .”). 
 35. See infra Part II.B.1-3 (discussing the Second Circuit and Supreme Court ATS 
jurisprudence and highlighting the debate about whether the statute provides for new causes 
of action). 
 36. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-24 (2004) (examining the history of the 
ATS and acknowledging the lower courts’ confusion as to whether the statute was intended to 
create new causes of action). 
 37. Id. at 714. 
 38. The Sosa court noted that, when the First Congress drafted the original version of the 
ATS, it had in mind three primary violations of the law of nations:  “violation of safe conducts, 
infringement on the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”  Id. at 724 (citing WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 68 (1769)).  These are collectively 
referred to as “the 18th century paradigms.”  Id. at 725. 
 39. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating a “violation of 
the law of nations” must be alleged “at the jurisdictional threshold” so courts have 
“accordingly, engaged in a more searching preliminary review of the merits . . . .”). 
 40. The issue of the intended scope of the ATS has been addressed by many Circuits.  
Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding 
that the ATS does not create a cause of action, merely a basis for subject matter jurisdiction) 
with In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 
1994) (holding that a cause of action is created by the ATS and that “nothing more than a 
violation of the law of nations is required to invoke [the ATS]” (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 779)).  For the purposes of this Note, only the Second Circuit’s 
opinions will be discussed in order to maintain the context of Abdullahi. 
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several cases41 and, in 2004, the Supreme Court undertook to provide 
some clarification.42 
1. The Second Circuit’s Interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute 
The ATS first began to enjoy judicial prevalence in 1980 when it 
provided jurisdiction in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.43  In that case, citizens of 
Paraguay brought an action against another Paraguayan, Americo Norberto 
Pena-Irala (Pena), for torturing and killing their son.44  Pena was in the 
United States on a visitor’s visa at the time.45  In Paraguay, Pena had been 
the Inspector General of Police in the plaintiff’s region.46  The court found 
that “deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates 
universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights . . . 
[t]hus . . . [the ATS] provides federal jurisdiction.”47  Aside from the 
reemergence of the ATS, Filartiga marked the beginning of the Second 
Circuit’s effort to define the “law of nations”48  and effectively initiated the 
creation of new causes of action under the ATS.49  Particularly, the court 
noted that “only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the 
wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express 
international accords,” is conduct violative of the law of nations and 
actionable under the statute.50  To illustrate this notion, the court cited Judge 
Friendly: “the mere fact that every nation’s municipal law may prohibit theft 
does not incorporate ‘the Eighth Commandment, ‘Thou Shalt not steal’ . . . 
[into] the law of nations.’“51  It is valuable to keep this distinction in mind 
while examining the remainder of the ATS cases discussed in this Note, 
particularly the 2009 Abdullahi decision.  It can be tempting to erroneously 
assume that an action decried by most nations must be violative of the “law 
of nations.” 
Fifteen years later, the Second Circuit decided Kadic v. Karadžić and 
further shaped both its definition of the law of nations and breadth of 
 
 41. See, e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247-50 (2d Cir. 
2003); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887-88 
(2d Cir. 1980). 
 42. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).  Sosa was the first, and so 
far only, Supreme Court case to analyze the ATS. 
 43. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 888. 
 51. Id. (citing ITT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
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potential causes of action.52  There, the plaintiffs were from Bosnia-
Herzegovina and brought suit against the self-proclaimed leader of the 
unrecognized Bosnian-Serb Republic, known as “Srpska.”53  The “president” 
of this region, Karadžić, allegedly commanded his forces to perpetrate a 
number of atrocities on Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina.54  
It was a bit murky whether Karadžić was a private or state actor55 but the 
court stated “[w]e do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the 
modern era, confines its reach to state action.”56  Specifically, it found that 
private actors may be sued under the ATS in cases where the alleged tort 
violates normal standards of “universal concern” that would intuitively 
extend to private party conduct.57  The court provided such examples as 
slavery, genocide, and war crimes.58  The Kadic holding introduced the 
need to analyze the “state action” component of the law of nations when 
dealing with suits against apparently private actors.  The court noted that a 
private actor would be liable under the ATS if he or she were the leader of 
an unrecognized state, acted under the color of authority, or acted in 
concert with a foreign state.59  The state action consideration will be more 
fully discussed in Part V(B), infra. 
In 2003, the Court provided a more detailed, albeit somewhat 
ambiguous, definition of the law of nations in Flores v. Southern Peru 
Copper Corp.60  Peruvian residents brought suit under the ATS against an 
American mining company, claiming that some of the mining operation’s 
pollution had caused severe—and in some cases, fatal—lung disease.61  
The court ultimately held that no source of international law supported the 
norm of customary international law put forth by the plaintiffs and that “right 
to life” and “right to health” were too indefinite to be regarded as binding 
international law.62  In a lengthy and detailed discussion of the law of 
nations and sources of international law, the court stated that, for the 
 
 52. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239-44 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 53. Id. at 236-37. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 239.  For example, Karadžić argued that he was not a state actor, but 
maintained that he was the President of the Republic of Srpska.  Id.  The court notes that the 
plaintiffs were also rather inconsistent “in pleading defendant’s role as President of Srpska.”  
Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 
(1987)). 
 58. Id. at 240 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987)). 
 59. Id. at 244-45. 
 60. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 61. Id. at 236-37. 
 62. Id. at 254-55, 266. 
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purposes of the ATS, the law of nations “refers to the body of law known as 
customary international law” and can be “discerned from myriad decisions 
made in numerous and varied international and domestic arenas.”63  It 
consists of “those clear and unambiguous rules by which States universally 
abide, or to which they accede, out of a sense of legal obligation and 
mutual concern.”64  Importantly, the Court also noted that the law of nations 
“does not stem from any single, definitive, readily-identifiable source.”65 
2. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the 
ATS 
One year after the Second Circuit decided Flores, the Supreme Court 
addressed the jurisdictional and substantive paradox of the ATS in a 
landmark decision.66  In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the plaintiff, Alvarez, was 
a Mexican citizen indicted for the murder of a United States agent in 
Mexico.67  A United States agency approved a plan to hire Mexican 
nationals to kidnap Alvarez and bring him to Texas where an outstanding 
warrant for his arrest would be executed.68  Pursuant to the plan, Sosa took 
Alvarez from his home in Mexico, “held him overnight in a motel,” and then 
brought him to the United States on a private plane.69  Alvarez was arrested 
and brought suit against Sosa under the ATS, claiming the statute authorizes 
the creation of new causes of action and that Alvarez violated a purported 
customary international norm against arbitrary detention.70 
In an exhaustive opinion that examined the history of the ATS and the 
future of its jurisdictional grants, the Court found that: 
[T]he ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.  This 
does not mean . . .that the ATS was stillborn because any claim for relief 
required a further statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes of action.  
Rather, the reasonable inference from history and practice is that the ATS 
was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law, on the 
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the 
modest number of international law violations thought to carry personal 
liability at the time: offenses against ambassadors, violation of safe 
conducts, and piracy.71  (emphasis added). 
 
 63. Id. at 247-48. 
 64. Id. at 252. 
 65. Flores, 414 F.3d at 247-48. 
 66. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 67. Id. at 697. 
 68. Id. at 697-98. 
 69. Id. at 698. 
 70. Id. at 698-99. 
 71. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694. 
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Rejecting Alvarez’s contention that the ATS—in addition to granting 
jurisdiction—was intended as authority to create new causes of action, the 
Court pointed to the placement of the statute within § 9 of the Judiciary 
Act.72  That section deals exclusively with federal jurisdiction and the Court 
notes that it is improbable that “the distinction between jurisdiction and 
cause of action [would] have been elided by the drafters of the Act.”73  The 
Court was cognizant that its ruling would raise a question about “the 
interaction between the ATS at the time of its enactment and the ambient 
law of the era.”74  It reconciled that question by noting the opinion of 
several Amici professors: “federal courts could entertain claims once the 
jurisdictional grant was on the books, because torts in violation of the law of 
nations would have been recognized within the common law of the time.”75 
Relying upon this premise and the idea that “nothing Congress has done 
is a reason for us to shut the door to the law of nations entirely,”76 the Court 
announced that federal judges have a limited power to recognize “a narrow 
class of international norms,” to be “judicially enforceable.”77  In the case of 
the specific norm championed by Alvarez, the Court stated: 
Whatever may be said for the broad principle [plaintiff] advances, in the 
present, imperfect world, it expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding 
customary rule having the specificity we require.  Creating a private cause of 
action to further that aspiration would go beyond any residual common law 
discretion we think it appropriate to exercise.78 
The prevailing standard for judicial enforceability would be that “any 
claim based on the present-day law of nations [must] rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms.”79  
Explicitly emphasizing the need for restraint, the Court advised that this 
“judicial power should be exercised on the understanding that the door is 
 
 72. Id. at 713. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 714. 
 75. Id.  See supra note 38 for the three specific violations of the law of nations recognized 
by English common law.  For a thorough description of the Court’s historical analysis of the 
ATS, see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714-24. 
 76. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.  The Court also noted that it “would welcome any 
congressional guidance” and acknowledged “that at any time (explicitly, or implicitly by 
treaties or statutes that occupy the field)” Congress may shut the door.  Id. 
 77. Id. at 729. 
 78. Id. at 738. 
 79. Id. at 725.  The Court’s emphasis on 18th century paradigms reflects its belief that 
the United States received the law of nations as it existed upon its independence.  Dhooge, 
supra note 31, at 421 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714 and Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 281 
(1796)). 
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still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping.”80  Among the reasons cited for the 
necessity of this “vigilant doorkeeping,” was the Court’s concern about 
maintaining separation of powers.81  “[T]he potential implications for the 
foreign relations of the United States of recognizing [new private causes of 
action] should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion 
of the Legislative and Executive branches in managing foreign affairs.”82  
Moreover, “[the judiciary has] no congressional mandate to seek out and 
define new and debatable violations of the law of nations . . . modern 
indications of [Congress] . . . have not affirmatively encouraged greater 
judicial creativity.”83 
In a compelling concurrence, Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) argued that no discretionary power “to 
create causes of action for the enforcement of international-law-based 
norms” should be reserved by the federal judiciary.84  Much of his argument 
turned on his interpretation of the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins holding that 
there is no federal general common law. 85  In particular, he notes that 
“federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and 
do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of 
decision.”86  To create federal common law “out of ‘international norms,’ 
and then construct[ ] a cause of a cause of action to enforce that command 
through the purely jurisdictional grant of the ATS, is nonsense upon stilts.”87  
Perhaps the best summarization of the concurrence’s argument is its 
characterization by the majority: “Justice Scalia [believes it best] to close the 
door to further independent judicial recognition of actionable international 
norms,”88 and Justice Scalia’s own statement: “I would subtract [from the 
Court’s opinion the] reservation of a discretionary power in the Federal 
Judiciary to create causes of action for the enforcement of international-law-
based norms.”89 
 
 80. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
 81. Id. at 727-28. 
 82. Id. at 727. 
 83. Id. at 728. 
 84. Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 85. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).  Justice Scalia’s full analysis 
of Erie as support for his position may be found at Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
739-49 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 86. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 
304, 312 (1981)). 
 87. Id. at 743. 
 88. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (majority opinion). 
 89. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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3. The Second Circuit’s Post-Sosa Opinions 
Following Sosa, there has been no shortage of cases filed under the 
ATS; apparently the relatively strict approach adopted by the Supreme Court 
has not scared off plaintiffs.  Rather, it seems they have latched on to the 
limited judicial discretion still accorded to the courts.  For its part, the 
Second Circuit was fairly conservative about granting ATS jurisdiction, at 
least until the 2009 Abdullahi decision. 
Following Sosa, the Second Circuit has addressed the ATS on several 
occasions.90  The first came in 2007 with Khulumani v. Barclay National 
Bank, Ltd.91  The plaintiffs sued “approximately fifty corporate defendants 
and hundreds of ‘corporate Does,’” alleging that they had collaborated with 
the South African government to maintain apartheid.92  The Court held that 
the ATS conferred jurisdiction on these multinational corporations “because 
they aided and abetted violations of customary international law.”93  The 
“law of nations” question was not addressed by the Court as it “decline[d] to 
determine whether plaintiffs have adequately pled a violation of 
international law sufficient to avail themselves of [ATS] jurisdiction.”94 
One year later, the Court denied ATS jurisdiction in Vietnam Association 
for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co.95 There, the plaintiffs 
brought suit under the ATS, alleging the defendants violated a customary 
international norm against the wartime use of Agent Orange.96  The court 
ruled that the sources of law on which the plaintiffs relied did not satisfy the 
Sosa standard.97  The sources advanced by the plaintiffs included the 1925 
Geneva Protocol (which was not ratified until after the cause of action 
accrued), the Nuremberg Code (which denounced the intentional use of 
chemicals to kill humans, not their use to kill plants and cut off food 
supplies), and a number of advisory opinions and letters that were not on 
point.98  Specifically, the court noted that the proffered materials did not 
 
 90. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Mora v. New York, 
524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008); Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 
517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
 91. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 258. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 174 (citing Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260). 
 94. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260-61. 
 95. Vietnam Ass’n, 517 F.3d 104, 123 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 96. Id. at 113.  Agent Orange was used during the Vietnam War to kill off brush and 
uncover potential enemy hiding places.  Id. at 120. 
 97. Id. at 119. 
 98. See id. at 118-23. 
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define a universal and sufficiently specific international norm against the 
manufacture and wartime use of Agent Orange.99 
The same year, the Second Circuit decided Mora v. People of the State 
of New York.100  The plaintiff argued that Article 36(1)(b)(3) of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations sufficiently defined an international norm 
against detaining an alien without informing him of the requirement of 
consular notice and access.101  As in Vietnam Association, the Court denied 
ATS jurisdiction on the basis that the plaintiff’s source of international law 
was not sufficiently universal and, thus, did not meet the Sosa standard.102 
One of the Court’s most recent occasions to formally determine ATS 
jurisdiction came, of course, with the 2009 decision of Abdullahi v Pfizer.103  
The manner in which the court ultimately determined that nonconsensual 
medical research falls within the law of nations will be examined in greater 
detail in Part IV below. 
III.  PRELIMINARY ABDULLAHI LITIGATION 
The 2009 Abdullahi decision was the product of several prior actions in 
the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit.  To fully 
appreciate the context of Abdullahi, it is necessary to examine this 
preliminary litigation.  As such, this section will discuss three preliminary suits 
commonly known as Abdullahi I, II, and III,104 a Nigerian action styled 
Zango v. Pfizer,105 and Adamu v. Pfizer,106 an action that was later 
consolidated into the 2009 Abdullahi case. 
A. Abdullahi I 
Abdullahi I was filed in August 2001 and represented the first time that 
the Abdullahi plaintiffs attempted to sue Pfizer for the 1996 Trovan study.107  
The plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to the ATS in the Southern District of 
New York, broadly alleging Pfizer had administered the drug knowing of its 
dangerous side effects, inadequately informed patients of the risk, failed to 
 
 99. Id. at 123. 
 100. Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 101. Id. at 186, 208. 
 102. Id. at 208-09. 
 103. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 104. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. (Abdullahi I), No. 01 CIV. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. (Abdullahi II), 77 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 
2003); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. (Abdullahi III), No. 01 CIV. 8118 (WHP), 2005 WL 1870811, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005). 
 105. Zango v. Pfizer, No. FHC/K/CS/204/2001 (Nigeria) (as cited in Abdullahi II, 77 F. 
App’x 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 106. Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc., 399 F.Supp.2d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 107. Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *3. 
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obtain informed consent, and neglected to follow up with the patients 
following Trovan administration.108  Pfizer moved to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim or, alternatively, for forum non conveniens.109  To decide the 
12(b)(6) motion, the court examined whether a violation of the law of 
nations had been pleaded adequately and whether Pfizer was a state—
rather than private—actor.110 
As to the law of nations inquiry, the court stated that it would have 
jurisdiction under the ATS “so long as plaintiffs [could] allege an 
international law violation as evidenced by principles of those agreements 
and regulations [that they had offered to prove a violation of the law of 
nations].”111  However, it recognized that whether the law of nations had 
been violated turned on whether Pfizer was a state or private actor.112  
Finding that the category of actionable claims was narrower for a private 
actor, the court held that if Pfizer were a private actor, there would not be a 
cause of action.113  However, it determined the plaintiffs had pleaded 
sufficient facts that Pfizer acted in a state capacity such that the 12(b)(6) 
motion could not be granted.114 
The forum non conveniens motion was afforded much more analysis in 
Abdullahi I115 and proved to be the basis for much of the subsequent 
litigation.116  The plaintiffs claimed that they could not bring suit in Kano’s 
Federal High Court (FHC) given its corruption and susceptibility to political 
influence.117  Pfizer argued that the FHC did provide an adequate forum 
because Pfizer was subject to service in Kano, Nigerian law recognizes 
“negligence, medical malpractice, and personal injury claims,” and—
perhaps most salient—Pfizer was, at that time, already defending an 
unrelated case in Kano’s FHC.118  Recognizing that it “has a duty to exercise 
restraint when assessing the sufficiency of other nations’ courts,”119 and that 
the public and private interest factors articulated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at *1. 
 110. Id. at *3-6. 
 111. Id. at *4. 
 112. Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *4-5. 
 113. Id. at *4-5. 
 114. See id. at *1, *6. 
 115. See id. at *6-12. 
 116. See infra this Part’s discussion of Zango v. Pfizer, Inc., Abdullahi II, Abdullahi III, and 
Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc. 
 117. Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *8. 
 118. Id. at *6-7. 
 119. Id. at *9. 
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favored suit in Nigeria,120 the court granted Pfizer’s motion to dismiss for 
forum non conveniens.121 
B. Zango v. Pfizer 
Zango v. Pfizer did not involve the same plaintiffs as the Abdullahi cases, 
but it ended up playing a significant role in the litigation leading up to the 
2009 decision.122  The Zango plaintiffs were subjects in the Trovan trial, but 
initially filed their suit in Nigeria, rather than the United States.123  The suit 
was fraught with administrative delays and the plaintiffs eventually 
discontinued the action in 2002.124  The Abdullahi plaintiffs sought to use 
Zango as evidence of Nigeria’s inadequacy as a forum, and the case was 
central to Abdullahi II and Abdullahi III.125 
C. Abdullahi II 
In Abdullahi II, the plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit from the 
Abdullahi I order to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens.126  
Specifically, the plaintiffs requested that the court take judicial notice of 
“both the fact of the [Zango] dismissal and the reasons for it.”127  Pfizer 
objected to the motion, alleging that the plaintiffs’ account of the Zango 
 
 120. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), set out a number of private and 
public interest factors to be carefully weighed by courts when deciding the issue of forum non 
conveniens.  Id. at 508-09.  The public interest factors include administrative difficulties, 
unfairness of imposing jury duty on citizens with few ties to or understanding of the litigation, 
avoidance of conflicts of law, and the favorability of deciding issues locally.  Id.  The private 
factors include availability of and access to witnesses and evidence and the availability of 
process.  Id. at 508.  Here, the court determined that none of the public interest factors 
“strongly support[ed] either forum over the other.”  Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *11.  
As to the private factors, the court found that “most of the documents and witnesses located in 
the United States [were] within Pfizer’s control” and could be brought easily to the Nigerian 
forum.  Id. at *12.  However, the plaintiff’s medical records, the testing site, and other 
“evidence of numerous elements essential to plaintiffs’ claim” were located in Nigeria.  Id. at 
*11.  Thus, the factors weighed in favor of Nigerian disposition.  Id. at *12. 
 121. Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *12. 
 122. See infra this Part’s discussion of Abdullahi II, Abdullahi III, and Adamu v. Pfizer. Inc. 
 123. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. (Abdullahi II), 77 F. App’x 48, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 124. Id. at 52 (noting that the Notice of Discontinuance filed by the Zango plaintiffs 
“blame[d] an indefinite adjournment and the fact that the judge hearing the case declined 
jurisdiction ‘for personal reasons’”). 
 125. See infra this Part’s discussion of Abdullahi II and Abdullahi III. 
 126. Abdullahi II, 77 F. App’x. at 50.  Pfizer also filed a cross appeal regarding the District 
Court’s denial of its 12(b)(6) motion.  Id.  This issue was not reached by the Second Circuit 
because it remanded the proceedings to the District Court with respect to the forum non 
conveniens issue.  Id. at 53. 
 127. Id. at 52. 
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proceedings was “disingenuous.”128  Further, Pfizer requested that the court 
take judicial notice of the entire Zango record, apparently arguing that a 
holistic view of the proceedings would demonstrate that Nigeria was an 
adequate forum.129  The court refused to adopt either party’s account of the 
Zango proceedings, noting that it could not “take judicial notice of factual 
propositions that are subject to reasonable dispute.”130  Instead, the court 
remanded the case to the District Court for additional fact-finding as to what 
caused the Zango dismissal and whether that impacted the adequate forum 
analysis.131 
It is interesting to note that, at the end of its opinion, the Second Circuit 
presciently suggested that Flores—which had just been decided—might, at 
some point, have an impact on the Abdullahi litigation.132  The court 
observed that Pfizer had not addressed in Abdullahi I the issue of whether its 
conduct violated the law of nations and that both parties had “glossed over 
the issue on appeal.”133  A footnote to this portion of the opinion indicates 
that when the District Court (in Abdullahi I) questioned Pfizer about the law 
of nations issue in oral argument, Pfizer merely maintained that it was 
unrelated to its motions and that it “would only pursue such an argument if 
the District Court found that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded state 
action.”134  This small observation by the Second Circuit proved to be a 
remarkable foreshadowing of the 2009 decision.135 
D. Abdullahi III 
Abdullahi III was the product of the Second Circuit’s remand in Abdullahi 
II.136  The District Court was charged with examining the Zango record in 
order to make a final determination as to the validity of the forum non 
conveniens dismissal originally ordered in Abdullahi I.137  Additionally, Pfizer 
moved to dismiss the action for a lack of ATS subject matter jurisdiction.138  
After examining the Zango record in its entirety, the court determined that 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 52-53 (citing WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 201.13[1][b] (Hon. Joseph M. 
McLaughlin ed., 1997)). 
 131. Abdullahi II, 77 F. App’x. at 53. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 53 n.4. 
 135. See infra Part IV (discussing the majority and dissenting opinions of the 2009 
decision, specifically how they differ in their analyses of the state action component). 
 136. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. (Abdullahi III), No. 01-CIV.8118 (WHP), 2005 WL 1870811, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005). 
 137. Id. at *3. 
 138. Id. at *1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
442 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:427 
some of the delay was attributable to the Zango counsel139 and that the 
Nigerian judiciary was not demonstrably biased against its own citizens.140  
The dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens stood.141 
Perhaps more interesting than the forum non conveniens analysis was 
the court’s discussion of Pfizer’s revised motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim.  Pfizer moved for 12(b)(6) dismissal “in light of ‘recent Supreme 
Court and Second Circuit decisions that sharply curtail claims under the 
[ATS].’”142  In fact, Sosa had been decided by the Supreme Court between 
Abdullahi II and III.143  The District Court noted that, in light of its decision to 
dismiss for forum non conveniens, it did not need to reach the ATS 
jurisdictional issue.144  However, “for the sake of judicial economy,” it 
undertook to perform the analysis.145 
The court first observed that “[p]rior to Sosa, a number of courts . . . 
had held that the ATS created a cause of action.”146  Keeping in mind a 
more or less firm holding from the Supreme Court that the ATS does not 
create new causes of action,147 the District Court took pains to distinguish 
between a mere violation of the law of nations and the existence of a private 
cause of action.  Although it acknowledged that “[p]laintiffs correctly state[d] 
that non-consensual medical experimentation violates the law of nations,”148 
the District Court importantly noted that “the law of nations does not itself 
create a right of action because it does not require any particular reaction to 
violations of law, and therefore whether and how the United States reacts to 
such violations are domestic questions.”149  The critical question, then, was 
 
 139. Id. at *17. 
 140. Id. at *16 (noting that, in 2001, Pfizer had actually lost a case brought in a Nigerian 
Federal High Court by Nigerian plaintiffs). 
 141. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *18. 
 142. Id. at *6 (quoting Pfizer’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss at 1 (Oct. 
1, 2004)). 
 143. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. 
(Abdullahi II), 77 F. App’x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2003); Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811 at 1* 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Sosa was decided about nine months after the Oct. 8, 2003, Abdullahi II 
decision, but over one year before the Aug. 9, 2005, Abdullahi III decision). 
 144. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *6. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at *7 (citing a number of cases which held that the ATS created a private right 
of action and comparing a number of cases which held that the ATS provides nothing more 
than subject matter jurisdiction). 
 147. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
 148. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *9. 
 149. Id. (citing In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 
(9th Cir. 1994)).  It is interesting to note that the District Court stated that Pfizer’s alleged 
violations of the law of nations included both non-consensual medical experimentation and 
failure to treat the subjects after Trovan administration.  The court then apparently dispenses 
with the failure to treat aspect altogether by announcing that the non-consensual 
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whether the court could infer a private right of action for Pfizer’s alleged 
violations of international law.150 
Emphasizing Sosa’s call for judicial restraint,151 the court examined the 
sources of international law proffered by the plaintiffs and found that they 
could not support ATS jurisdiction.152  With respect to all five sources, the 
court determined that they did not give rise to a private cause of action.153  
Additionally the court noted, inter alia, the following shortcomings: some 
sources were authored by non-governmental bodies,154 some sources had 
broad or aspirational language that lacked the requisite specificity to grant 
ATS jurisdiction,155 and some sources to which the United States was party 
were not self-executing.156  The court also made a broad observation that 
reflects the inherent difficulty of adopting any purported sources of 
international law as a basis for ATS jurisdiction: 
Besides the obvious difficulty of enforcing a principle that is so purposefully 
general in order that the greatest number of countries can agree while still 
disagreeing on the particulars of how to implement the goal, there is also 
the great problem that international agreements often set patently 
unattainable goals that cannot reasonably be considered legal obligations 
of those countries that hope to one day fulfill those aspirations.157 
Ultimately, the court found that “[a] cause of action for Pfizer’s ‘failure to 
get any consent, informed or otherwise, before performing medical 
experiments on the subject children’ would expand customary international 
 
experimentation was violative of the law of nations and proceeding with a correspondingly 
specific analysis of the private right of action question.  The failure to treat issue does not 
appear again in the opinion. 
 150. Id. at *10. 
 151. See id. at *9-14. 
 152. See id. at *11-14.  After analyzing Sosa’s application to the case, the court found 
“that none of the sources of international law on which Plaintiffs advance provide a proper 
predicate for jurisdiction under the ATS.”  Id. at *14. 
 153. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *10-13.  “Plaintiffs allege that their claims under 
the ATS are supported by international law as set forth in the Nuremberg Code, the 
Declaration of Helsinki, guidelines authored by the CIOMS, article 7 of the ICCPR and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”  Id. at *11. 
 154. See id. at *12 (The court notes that both the World Medical Association’s Declaration 
of Helsinki and the Council for International Organizations of Medical Services (CIOMS) 
Guidelines are the products of non-governmental bodies.). 
 155. See id. at *12-13 (The court observed that the Declaration of Helsinki was “general” 
and “asserted aspirations,” the CIOMS Guidelines contained “broad, aspirational language,” 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) employed “vague language,” 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was “merely aspirational.”). 
 156. See id. at *11-13 (The court states that the ICCPR is not self-executing and, in a 
similar vein, points out that the United States has not even ratified or adopted the Nuremberg 
Code.). 
 157. Id. at *14 (citation omitted). 
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law far beyond that contemplated by the ATS,”158 and that “none of the 
sources of international law on which Plaintiffs advance provide a proper 
predicate for jurisdiction under the ATS.”159 
E. Adamu v. Pfizer 
Adamu was the final step in the litigation leading up to the 2009 
decision.  In late 2002, after the Zango suit had been dismissed, a portion 
of the Zango plaintiffs filed the Adamu action160 in the District of 
Connecticut.161  They alleged substantially the same causes of action as the 
Abdullahi plaintiffs and relied on many of the same purported sources of 
customary international law.162  The case was eventually transferred to the 
Southern District of New York.163  As it had in the Abdullahi cases, Pfizer 
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, forum non conveniens, and 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.164  Judge Pauley, who had decided the 
previous Abdullahi District Court cases, granted all of Pfizer’s motions.165  
He characterized the central issue as follows: “because Pfizer is not alleged 
to have violated any treaty, to state a claim under the ATS, Plaintiffs must 
demonstrate violation of a ‘clear and unambiguous’ rule of customary 
international law.”166  Not surprisingly, the Abdullahi III “analysis of the 
various sources of international law” was incorporated into the Adamu 
action.167  The Adamu plaintiffs joined the Abdullahi plaintiffs in a 
consolidated appeal that resulted in the 2009 decision.168 
IV.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S 2009 DECISION OF ABDULLAHI v. PFIZER 
At the heart of Abdullahi is the issue of whether there is a norm of 
customary international law that prohibits non-consensual medical 
experimentation.169 The Second Circuit determined this question in the 
 
 158. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *14. 
 159. Id.  Interestingly, the court did not examine whether Pfizer was a state or private actor.  
It rested its conclusion solely on the inadequacy of the proffered sources of international law. 
 160. Adbullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 161. Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc., 399 F.Supp.2d 495, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 162. See id. at 497. 
 163. Id. at 495, 498. 
 164. See id. at 497-500. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Adamu, 399 F.Supp.2d at 501 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 
(2d Cir. 1980)). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied mem., 130 S. Ct. 
3541 (2010). 
 169. Id. at 174-75. 
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affirmative170 and the basis for that decision will be discussed in this Part.  
The Court examined a number of purported sources of international law on 
which the plaintiffs based their complaint, as well as some additional 
instruments it considered to be authoritative.171  Those sources will be 
examined in detail at the end of this Part, but first, a discussion of the 
general arguments advanced by the Abdullahi majority and dissent will help 
to provide some context. 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The majority reversed the District Court’s finding in Abdullahi III that the 
“prohibition in customary international law against nonconsensual human 
medical experimentation cannot be enforced through the ATS.”172  It found 
that “[t]he district court’s approach misconstrued both the nature of 
customary international law and the scope of the inquiry required by 
Sosa.”173  That is, the District Court erroneously resolved the question of 
whether a norm of customary international law is sufficiently specific, 
universal, and obligatory by looking only at whether each source of law 
stating the norm is binding and whether each source explicitly authorizes a 
cause of action to enforce the norm.174  In focusing only on whether a 
source was binding, not giving adequate weight to the collective value of 
non-binding conventions, and looking only at sources to which the United 
States is a party, the District Court (in the majority’s estimation) did not make 
a sufficiently extensive “examination of whether treaties, international 
agreements, or State practice have ripened the prohibition of 
nonconsensual medical experimentation on human subjects into a 
customary international law norm . . . [sufficient under Sosa] . . . to permit 
courts to infer a cause of action under the ATS.”175  Specifically, “the district 
court should have considered a greater range of evidence and weighed 
differently the probative value of the sources.”176 
The Second Circuit majority held that the plaintiffs “pled facts sufficient 
to state a cause of action under the ATS for a violation of the norm of 
customary international law prohibiting medical experimentation on human 
subjects without their consent . . . ATS jurisdiction exists over plaintiffs’ 
 
 170. Id. at 175 (citing Abdullahi v. Pfizer (Abdullahi III), No. 01CIV.8118 (WHP), 2005 WL 
1870811, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005)). 
 171. See id. at 174-88. 
 172. Id. at 169. 
 173. Id. at 176. 
 174. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 177. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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claims.”177  Underlying its analysis was an inquiry as to whether this alleged 
norm is: “(1) . . . a norm of international character that States universally 
abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation; (2) . . . defined 
with a specificity comparable to the 18th-century paradigms discussed in 
Sosa; and (3) . . . of mutual concern to States.”178 
With respect to the universality factor, the court noted that “[t]he 
prohibition on nonconsensual medical experimentation . . . is specific, 
focused and accepted by nations around the world without significant 
exception.”179  Finding the norm had the requisite specificity, the court 
stated “[w]e have little trouble concluding that [the norm] . . . is every bit as 
concrete—indeed even more so—than the norm prohibiting piracy . . . or 
the interference with the right of safe conducts and the rights of 
ambassadors . . . .”180  As to the third factor (mutual concern), the court 
pointed to the facts that “‘the nations [of the world] have made it their 
business, both through international accords and unilateral action’ to 
demonstrate their intention to eliminate conduct [of this type]”181 and that 
the “administration of drug trials without informed consent also poses 
threats to national security by impairing our relations with other 
countries.”182  To support this notion, the court noted, 
Seven of the world’s twelve largest pharmaceutical manufacturers – a group 
that includes Pfizer – are American companies. Consequently, American 
companies are likely to be sponsors of medical experiments on human 
subjects abroad . . . the failure to secure consent for human 
experimentation has the potential to generate substantial anti-American 
animus and hostility.183 
The majority dedicated a scant three paragraphs to the question of state 
action.184  Citing Kadic, it noted that a private individual can be subject to 
 
 177. Id. at 187. 
 178. Id. at 174.  This standard follows the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Sosa.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725-28 (2004). 
 179. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 177. 
 180. Id. at 184. 
 181. Id. at 185 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 182. Id. at 187. 
 183. Id. (citing Global 500, FORTUNE, July 21, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/ 
fortune/global500/2008/industries/21/index.html).  Since the Second Circuit issued its 
opinion, the Global 500 list has changed slightly, such that only six of the top twelve 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are American (Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Abbott, Merck, Eli 
Lilly, and Bristol-Myers-Squibb).  Global 500, FORTUNE, February 21, 2010, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/full_list/.  Either way, the court’s 
logic is arguably flawed; the fact that fifty percent (or fifty-eight percent, according to the 2008 
list) of large pharmaceutical companies are American does not have any bearing on those 
companies’ propensities toward overseas clinical trials. 
 184. See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 188-89. 
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ATS liability where he “‘act[s] in concert with’ the state, i.e., ‘under color of 
law.’”185  Moreover, “[u]nder §1983, State action may be found when ‘there 
is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that 
seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State 
itself.’”186  The court found that there was such a nexus between Nigeria and 
Pfizer’s conduct; in particular, it pointed to the appellants’ allegations that 
“the Nigerian government was involved in all stages of the Kano test,” “the 
Nigerian government provided a letter of request to the FDA to authorize the 
export of Trovan, arranged for Pfizer’s accommodations in Kano, and 
facilitated the nonconsensual testing . . . .”187  The majority goes on to state: 
The unlawful conduct is alleged to have occurred in a Nigerian facility . . .  
Nigerian officials are alleged to have conspired to cover up the violations by 
silencing Nigerian physicians critical of the test and by back-dating an 
‘approval letter’ that the FDA . . . required to be provided prior to 
conducting the medical experiment . . . [and] that the Nigerian government 
‘was intimately involved and contributed, aided, assisted and facilitated 
Pfizer’s efforts to conduct the Trovan test.’188 
These alleged facts were merely listed, rather than discussed, and the 
majority found that “[a]t the pleading stage, these contentions meet the state 
action test because they adequately allege that the violations occurred as 
the result of concerted action between Pfizer and the Nigerian 
government.”189  While the list of instances of “concerted action” may 
appear to be extensive, the dissenting opinion reveals that a number of the 
allegations were inappropriately included and considered.190 
B. The Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissent, Judge Wesley stated “I agree with the methodology used 
by the majority to determine whether a norm falls within the jurisdictional 
grant of the ATS, but I do not agree with their conclusion that a norm 
against non-consensual medical experimentation . . . is (1) universal and 
obligatory or (2) a matter of mutual concern.”191  In particular, he took issue 
with the majority’s undertaking “to define a ‘firmly established’ norm of 
international law, heretofore unrecognized by any American court or treaty 
obligation, on the basis of materials inadequate for the task.”192  In 
 
 185. Id. at 188 (quoting Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 186. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). 
 187. Id. at 188. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 188-89. 
 190. See infra Part IV.B. 
 191. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 192 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. at 191. 
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assessing the “universal and obligatory” factor, Judge Wesley examined the 
eight sources of customary international law relied upon by the majority and 
concluded that “[t]aken together, this evidence falls short of charting the 
existence of a universal and obligatory international norm . . . .”193  With 
respect to the “mutual concern” factor, he noted that nonconsensual 
medical experimentation does not “threaten serious consequences in 
international affairs in the same manner or to the same extent as the 
historical paradigms listed by the Supreme Court or their modern 
counterparts identified by this Court.”194 
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between Judge Wesley’s 
opinion and the majority’s is Judge Wesley’s assertion that “a customary 
international law norm cannot be divorced from . . . its violator.”195  That is, 
the fact that the majority glossed over the state action issue and did not 
meaningfully consider the distinct possibility that Pfizer was a private actor 
resulted in an incomplete and inadequate analysis.196  There is an 
appreciable difference between a customary international norm against 
nonconsensual medical experimentation by private actors and a norm 
against such conduct by state actors.197  Many potential international law 
sources are directed only at states.  Thus, they carry no evidentiary value 
when a plaintiff alleges a violation of a norm of customary international law 
by a private actor.198 
Judge Wesley dedicated a substantial portion of his opinion to the state 
action consideration, noting that both Sosa and Flores had “made clear that 
the identity of the defendant is a critical component of whether a principle is 
a norm of customary international law.”199  In determining whether Pfizer 
should be considered a state actor, Judge Wesley focused on the 
procedural context of the Abdullahi litigation.200  In the original Abdullahi 
and Adamu complaints, which “total[ed] 628 paragraphs” the plaintiffs 
made just four allegations concerning the involvement of the Nigerian 
government in the Trovan testing: 
(1) in order for the FDA to authorize the export of Trovan, ‘Pfizer obtained 
the required letter of request from the Nigerian government’; (2) the 
government ‘arrang[ed] for Pfizer’s accommodation in Kano’; (3) the 
government acted ‘to silence Nigerian physicians critical of [Pfizer’s] test’; 
 
 193. Id. at 192-93. 
 194. Id. at 209. 
 195. Id. at 194. 
 196. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d. at 194 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
 197. Id. 
 198. It is important to keep this distinction in mind as the Abdullahi sources are examined 
in Part IV(C), infra. 
 199. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 209-10 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
 200. Id. at 210. 
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and (4) the government ‘assign[ed] Nigerian physicians to assist in the 
project.’201 
The plaintiffs attempted to “bolster their complaints” by alleging for the first 
time in their appellate brief further ways in which the Nigerian government 
played a role in the Trovan trials.202  Although the majority adopted these 
additional complaints into its list of actions probative of Pfizer’s status as a 
state actor, the dissent points out that appellate review “is limited to the facts 
as asserted within the four corners of the complaint.”203  Noting that “in 
most cases, a finding of state action ‘must be premised upon the fact that 
the State is responsible’ for that specific conduct”204 and that “[d]etermining 
state action . . . ‘requires tracing the activity to its source to see if that source 
fairly can be said to be the state,’”205 Judge Wesley concluded that the 
plaintiff’s “bare allegations [were] plainly insufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss for lack of state action.”206  Of particular importance was the fact 
that the “activity was not, as the majority apparently concludes, conducting 
the Trovan trials in general, but rather administering the drug without 
informed consent.”207  This is a significant nuance, in that it renders 
irrelevant many of the items that the majority considered in deciding that 
Pfizer was a state actor. 
Judge Wesley went on to say that the “plaintiffs’ complaints are more 
noteworthy for what they do not allege than what they do.”208  Among other 
things, “[t]hey have not suggested that Pfizer was exercising any delegated 
state authority . . . that Pfizer conspired with government officials to deprive 
the subjects of their rights, . . . that the Nigerian government exercised any 
coercive power over Pfizer, . . . [or that] any Nigerian government officials 
even knew about the non-consensual tests . . . .”209  Judge Wesley 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 210-11 (citing McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d 
Cir. 2007)).  See also Recent Case, Second Circuit Looks Beyond Complaint to Find State 
Action Requirement Satisfied – Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), 123 
HARV. L. REV. 768, 774-75 (2010) [hereinafter Second Circuit Looks Beyond] (noting “[t]he 
majority’s reliance on these new allegations, however, was procedurally barred . . . .  Courts 
may not rely on new facts in appellate briefs,” and arguing that “[a]llowing plaintiffs to 
supplement their complaints with additional facts after a district court has correctly rejected 
their claim will make it much easier for an ATS plaintiff to survive the pleadings stage through 
clever use of the appeals process.”). 
 204. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 211 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (citing Horvath v. Westport Library 
Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 205. Id. at 211 (citing Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 340 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 211 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
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concluded that “[a]t most, Plaintiffs’ complaints alleged that the Nigerian 
government acquiesced to or approved the Trovan program in general 
without knowing its disturbing details.”210 
In his conclusion, Judge Wesley noted that, while Pfizer’s alleged 
conduct was reproachable, “[t]he issue on this appeal . . . is not whether 
Pfizer’s alleged conduct was ‘wrong,’ . . . but whether it falls within . . . the 
‘narrow class’ of international norms for which ATS jurisdiction 
exists . . . .”211  Echoing the admonition of the Sosa court, he stated: 
[It is] pellucidly clear that ATS jurisdiction must be reserved only for acts that 
the nations of the world collectively determine interfere with their formal 
relations with one another—including those rare acts by private individuals 
that are so serious as to threaten the very fabric of peaceful international 
affairs.  I cannot agree with my colleagues that Pfizer’s alleged conduct 
poses the same threat or is so universally and internationally proscribed as 
to fit within that narrow class.212 
C. Sources Put Forth by the Abdullahi Plaintiffs as Evidence of a Customary 
International Norm Against Non-Consensual Medical Research 
Having taken a broad look at the majority and dissenting opinions, it is 
appropriate to turn to a more detailed examination of the sources of law 
analyzed by the Abdullahi court. 
Nuremberg Code 
The first principle of the Nuremberg Code (Code)213 states that 
“voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.”214  The 
Code was promulgated in 1947 as a part of the International Military 
Tribunal’s (IMT) final judgment against a number of doctors found guilty (in 
The Medical Case) of war crimes and crimes against humanity for 
performing non-consensual medical testing during World War II.215  The 
Abdullahi majority noted that the IMT’s constitution was the London 
 
 210. Id. at 212. 
 211. Id. at 213. 
 212. Id. 
 213. The Medical Case, in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 1, 181 (1949). 
 214. Id. at 181. 
 215. Sharon Perley et al., The Nuremberg Code: An International Overview, in THE NAZI 
DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 149, 150-55 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin 
eds., 1992).  “The tribunal emphasized that ‘[i]n every single instance appearing in the record, 
subjects were used who did not consent to the experiments; indeed, as to some of the 
experiments, it is not even contended by the defendants that the subjects occupied the status 
of volunteers.’”  Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 178 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing The Medical 
Case, supra note 213, at 183). 
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Charter216 and emphasized that Control Council Law No. 10, which 
authorized the creation of U.S. military tribunals, was enacted by the Allied 
Control Council, an entity through which members of the London 
Agreement exerted control over Germany.217  The majority stated this in 
order to demonstrate that the Code flowed directly from the principles of law 
advanced in the London Charter.218  The court’s argument basically went as 
follows: the London Agreement gave rise to the London Charter which 
provided a constitution for the IMT.219  Meanwhile, the Allied Control 
Council was the principal authority through which the London Agreement 
parties exerted control over Germany post-WWII.220  The Council enacted 
Control Council Law No. 10 which authorized the military tribunal that 
issued the opinion that gave birth to the Nuremberg Code.221  Therefore, 
the Code is naturally a product of the London Charter, which defined broad 
categories of Crimes Against Humanity and Crimes Against Nature.222 
In his dissent, Judge Wesley argued that the majority’s view of the Code 
was flawed because the Code did not deal with the broad and general 
principles of law addressed in the London Charter, but rather with the 
specific issue of consensual experimentation and research.223  Specifically, 
“[t]he ethical principles espoused in the Code had no forebears in either the 
London Charter or the judgment of the [IMT].  They were developed 
exclusively in the Medical Case.”224  While the dissent is cognizant that the 
Code was “groundbreaking,” Judge Wesley points out that its history gives 
rise to an inherent difficulty in measuring the Code’s probative value.225  
Because it is not a treaty and was developed by the United States military 
and announced in a military court, it does not fit any of the International 
 
 216. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 177.  The London Charter was annexed to the London 
Agreement, a 1945 agreement between the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, 
and France to, “in the interests of all the United Nations,” establish the IMT.  See Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Respecting the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter]. 
 217. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 178.  See also TELFORD TAYLOR, CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR 
CRIMES, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 6-10, 250 (1949). 
 218. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 178-81. 
 219. Id. at 177-78.  See also London Charter, supra note 216. 
 220. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 178. 
 221. Id. at 178.  See also TAYLOR, supra note 217. 
 222. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 177-79.  See also London Charter, supra note 216. 
 223. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 200-01 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
 224. Id. at 201. 
 225. Id. 
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Court of Justice Statute (ICJS) categories of international law sources.226  
Indeed, its closest ICJS analogue is a judicial decision, which is regarded as 
a subsidiary, rather than primary, source.227  Thus, Judge Wesley concluded 
the Code has some “evidentiary value in [the] inquiry,” but cannot establish 
a customary norm prohibiting non-consensual medical testing.228 
WMA Declaration of Helsinki229 
The original Declaration of Helsinki, adopted by the World Medical 
Association in 1964,230 announces several ethical guidelines for physicians 
world-wide and specifically provides detailed recommendations with respect 
to informed consent in medical trials.231  The majority conceded that the 
Declaration is non-binding, but claimed that “it has spurred States to 
regulate human experimentation, often by incorporating its informed 
consent requirement into domestic laws or regulations.”232  That this 
requirement has been the subject of domestic legislation in at least eighty-
four countries “is not, of course, in and of itself proof of a norm.”233  
However, the majority noted 
the incorporation of this norm into the laws of this country and . . . others is 
a powerful indication of the international acceptance of this norm as a 
binding legal obligation, where, as here, states have shown that the norm is 
of mutual concern by including it in a variety of international accords.234 
Additionally, it observed that “[t]ellingly, the sources on which our 
government relied in outlawing non-consensual human medical 
experimentation were the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki, 
 
 226. Id.  See infra Part V.A for a more detailed discussion of Article 38 of the International 
Court of Justice Statute and the categories of international law sources. 
 227. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 201 (Wesley, J., dissenting).  See infra Part V.A for a more 
detailed discussion of Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statute and the categories 
of international law sources. 
 228. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 201 (Wesley, J., dissenting).  Note that a broad view of the 
Code’s context also calls into question its utility in determining the norm at issue in this case.  
Both the majority and dissent agree that the Code stemmed from the prosecution of war 
crimes.  Nazi doctors were performing forced experimentation upon prisoners; it is reasonable 
to gather that the military tribunal did not have in mind cases such as Abdullahi when it 
published the Code. 
 229. World Med. Ass’n (WMA), Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical 
Research Involving Human Subjects, DoH/Oct2008 (adopted 1964, amended 1975, 1983, 
1989, 1996, and 2000), available at  http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/ 
17c.pdf. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at arts. 20, 22. 
 232. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 181 (majority opinion). 
 233. Id. (citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 234. Id. 
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which suggests the government conceived of these sources’ articulation of 
the norm as a binding legal obligation.”235 
In his dissenting opinion however, Judge Wesley pointed to holdings in 
both United States v. Yousef and Flores to argue that the Declaration of 
Helsinki should not be given great weight.236  Yousef held that “no private 
person or—group of men and women such as comprise the body of 
international law scholars—creates the law.”237  However “well-meaning” a 
private aspirational declaration may be, it does not and cannot rise to 
requisite level to create international law.238  Flores, as described in 
Abdullahi, held that including a private organization’s political statement in 
the “select and conscribed group of sources capable of creating 
international law” would have the undesirable effect of instilling 
governmental authority in non-democratic and unaccountable groups.239  
Here, the WMA is an international group of independent physicians and 
private medical groups.240 
CIOMS Guidelines241 
In 2002, the Council for International Organizations of Medical Services 
(CIOMS), in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), 
prepared a resource entitled “International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
 
 235. Id. at 182 (citing M. Cheriff Bassiouni, Thomas G. Baffes & John T. Evrard, An 
Appraisal of Human Experimentation in International Law and Practice: The Need for 
International Regulation of Human Experimentation, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1597, 
1625-26 and 21 C.F.R. § 310.102(h) (1981)).  This does not seem to be a particularly 
compelling argument as the majority conceded that the Declaration of Helsinki was a non-
binding instrument.  Id.  The logic is circular, essentially reasoning that if the United States 
adopts a provision of a non-binding instrument, that provision must be a norm of customary 
international law.  Since it is a norm of customary international law, the source in which it may 
be found is probative of the fact that it is a binding norm of customary international law. 
 236. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 197-98 (Wesley, J., dissenting).  Here, the WMA is an 
international group of independent physicians and private medical groups. Members, WORLD 
MED. ASS’N, http://www.wma.net/en/60about/10members/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 
2011). 
 237. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 102 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 238. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 198 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (citing Yousef, 327 F.3d at 102)). 
 239. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 198 (Wesely, J., dissenting).  Flores also echoed the 
sentiments of Yousef, stating that “[multinational] declarations are almost invariably political 
statements – expressing the sensibilities and the asserted aspirations and demands of some 
countries or organizations – rather than statements of universally-recognized legal obligations 
. . . .  [S]uch declarations are not proper evidence of customary international law.”  Id. at 197 
(citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 262 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 240. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 197 (Wesley, J., dissenting).  See also Members, supra note 
236. 
 241. COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCIS. & WORLD HEALTH ORG., 3 INTERNATIONAL 
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2002). 
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Research Involving Human Subjects” (CIOMS Guidelines).242  It provides 
that “the investigator must obtain the voluntary informed consent of the 
prospective subject . . . .”243  The Abdullahi plaintiffs relied on the CIOMS 
Guidelines as one of four sources of international law purportedly showing 
a customary international norm against nonconsensual medical research.244  
However, the majority never examined these guidelines in its opinion245 and 
the dissent only mentioned them in conjunction with its discussion of the 
Declaration of Helsinki, dismissing them as “put forward by [an] entirely 
private [organization]—hardly evidence of the state of international law.”246  
The paucity of analysis with respect to the CIOMS guidelines is probably 
well-founded; the mere fact that they are “guidelines” reflects their lack of 
probative value. 
ICCPR 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states 
that “no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation.”247 
In his dissent, Judge Wesley claimed that the ICCPR “is not appropriate 
evidence of customary international law . . . .”248  Specifically, he pointed 
out that the Sosa court held that, while the ICCPR has “moral authority,” it 
has minimal utility under the universal/specific/mutual concern standard 
because it was ratified by the United States “on the express understanding 
that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations 
enforceable in the federal courts.”249  The Sosa court noted that it would be 
impossible for the plaintiff to say that the ICCPR establishes “the relevant 
and applicable rule of law” and that, in fact, the plaintiff attempted instead 
to use it to merely show that the norm for which he advocated (a prohibition 
against arbitrary detention) had become binding customary international law 
elsewhere.250 
The majority, however, argued that “the ICCPR, when viewed as a 
reaffirmation of the norm as articulated in the Nuremberg Code, is potent 
authority for the universal acceptance of the prohibition on nonconsensual 
 
 242. Id. at Background. 
 243. Id. at Guideline 4. 
 244. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 175. 
 245. See id. at 163-88. 
 246. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 197 (Wesely, J., dissenting). 
 247. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 248. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 195 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
 249. Id. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004)). 
 250. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004). 
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medical experimentation.”251  The majority also claimed that Congress’s 
legislative prohibition of nonconsensual medical testing, as well as the 
FDA’s efforts, “demonstrates that the United States government views the 
norm as the source of a binding legal obligation even though the United 
States has not ratified the ICCPR in full.”252  It rested this notion on its 
reading of Khulumani, where the court held that treaties that have not been 
ratified may still demonstrate a customary international law norm for ATS 
purposes, as long as the treaty has been widely ratified and it is obvious that 
the United States has not declined to subscribe to the treaty on any grounds 
pertaining to the norm at issue.253 
Given the facts of Abdullahi, perhaps the most salient consideration with 
respect to this source was put forth in the dissent by Judge Wesley—the 
ICCPR explicitly applies to “[e]ach State Party”254 and governs “the 
relationship between a State and the individuals within the State’s 
territory.”255  Thus, “the ICCPR only creates obligations flowing from a state 
to persons within its territory”256 and cannot be violated by a purely private 
actor.257  If it is determined that Pfizer was not working in concert with the 
Nigerian government (as Judge Wesley urged), Pfizer is a private actor and 
the ICCPR would have no effect in this case.258 
 
 251. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 180. 
 252. Id. at 180-81. 
 253. Id. at 181 n.11 (citing Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 276 n.9 
(2d Cir. 2007)).  This seems to be a questionable notion in that it rejects the original ATS 
drafters’ perceived intent and concerns.  The ATS was intended only to confer jurisdiction in a 
limited number of instances, and only those firmly embedded in the common law.  Sosa, 542 
U.S. at 722-23 (noting that the First Congress likely only had in mind three specific examples 
of violations of the law of nations).  To allow a treaty not ratified by the United States to 
function as evidence of a customary norm would seem to make the United States subject to 
the decisions of other nations, rather than its own law. 
 254. ICCPR, supra note 247, at art. 2(1). 
 255. Abdullahi, F.3d at 195 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Duarte-Acero, 
296 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
 256. Id. at 195-96. 
 257. Id. at 196. 
 258. Id.  That the ICCPR would not even apply to Pfizer if it is found to be a private actor 
highlights the crucial impact of the majority’s and dissent’s disagreement on the state action 
component. 
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D. Additional Sources Relied Upon by the Abdullahi Majority 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Convention)259 
states that an “intervention in the health field may only be carried out after 
the person concerned has given free and informed consent . . . .”260  As the 
majority noted, it is “a binding convention and a source of customary 
international law” and “[s]ince 1997, thirty-four member States of the 
Council of Europe have also signed [it].”261  Judge Wesley, however, 
pointed out that the Convention is a “regional agreement not signed by the 
most influential states in the region” and that, while signed by thirty-four 
members, it has been ratified by just twenty-two.262  “[A] treaty’s evidentiary 
value increases along with the influence . . . of the states that have ratified 
it.”263  France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Russia, and 
Italy—some of the most influential member states—all have declined to 
ratify the convention.264  Thus, in Judge Wesley’s estimation, the Convention 
does not carry a great deal of probative value.265  Moreover, Pfizer’s alleged 
conduct took place in 1996, one year before the Convention was opened 
for signatures.266  To consider it in determining the state of international law 
in this case would be to create authority for an “international ex post facto 
definition of the law of nations.”267 
UNESCO Universal Declaration of Bioethics & Human Rights of 2005 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) drafted and adopted its Universal Declaration of Bioethics & 
 
 259. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, opened for signature Apr. 4, 1997, E.T.S. No. 164, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/164.htm. 
 260. Id. at ch. II, art. 5. 
 261. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 183 (citing Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=164&CM=&DF=& 
CL=ENG (last visited Feb. 26, 2011)). 
 262. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 196 (Wesley, J., dissenting).  It should be noted that the 
Convention has now been ratified by twenty-seven members.  See Chart of Signatures and 
Ratifications, supra note 261. 
 263. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 196 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (citing Flores v. Southern Peru 
Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 257 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 264. Id. (citing Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, supra note 261). 
 265. See id. 
 266. Id. at 196-97. 
 267. Id. at 197. 
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Human Rights in October of 2005 (UNESCO Declaration).268  It announces 
the need for “the prior, free and informed consent of” any subject in a 
clinical trial.269  The majority in Abdullahi did not undertake to analyze 
thoroughly the UNESCO Declaration, but rather mentioned it to 
demonstrate the “norm prohibiting nonconsensual medical experimentation 
on human subjects has become firmly embedded and has secured universal 
acceptance in the community of nations.”270 
In the dissent, Judge Wesley simply pointed to the same flaw he did for 
the Convention—that the instrument was drafted and promulgated well after 
the Abdullahi action arose.271  It is worthwhile to further note that the 
UNESCO Declaration is directed at “Member States.”272  Once again, the 
importance of thoroughly and accurately performing the state action 
analysis is evident; the UNESCO Declaration could not be used to impute 
liability to Pfizer as a private actor. 
European Parliament Clinical Trial Directive of 2001 
In 2001, the European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
passed the Clinical Trial Directive of 2001 (2001 Directive),273 which 
accepted and incorporated the informed consent principles of the 
Declaration of Helsinki.274  The 2001 Directive mandated informed consent 
in all clinical trials275 and required all member States to implement its 
regulations by 2004.276  The Abduallahi majority relied upon the 2001 
Directive as an “[a]dditional international law [source] support[ing] the 
norm’s status as customary international law.”277  Once again, a dissenting 
Judge Wesley noted that the tortious conduct alleged in Abdullahi took 
place in 1996, five years before the adoption of the 2001 Directive.278  The 
action was first filed in the United States in 2001279, three years before the 
deadline for the Directive’s enactment by member states.280  Although the 
 
 268. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, E.S.C. Res. 36, 33d Sess., 
U.N. Doc. SHS/EST/BIO/06/1 (Oct. 19, 2005). 
 269. Id. at art. 6. 
 270. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 271. Id. at 196-97 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
 272. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, supra note 268. 
 273. Council Directive 2001/20, pmbl. (2), 2001 O.J. (L 121) 37 (EC) [hereinafter 2001 
Directive]. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See id. at arts. 2(j), 3, 4. 
 276. Id. at art. 22(l). 
 277. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 183 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 278. Id. at 197 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
 279. Id. at 170. 
 280. 2001 Directive, supra note 273, at art. 22(l). 
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2001 Directive may evidence the state of law in the European Union, it is 
not necessarily indicative of the state of law in the rest of the world.281  
While it might provide a modicum of probative value, it cannot be afforded 
a great deal of weight given the regional specificity of its adoption. 
The United States’ Domestic Informed Consent Regulations 
The United States has codified a domestic informed consent regulation 
stating that “no investigator may involve a human being as a subject in 
research. . . .unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective 
informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative.”282  The FDA requires this informed consent for any 
American research used to support new drug approval applications, 
regardless of whether the research is conducted domestically or abroad.283  
The majority noted that the fact that the government, via regulations, uses 
“domestic law to coerce compliance with the norm” is evidentiary of the 
importance it attributes to the norm.284  The dissent argued that state 
practice is “not ‘significant or relevant for purposes of customary 
international law’”285 unless the state is prohibiting domestic action as a 
result of “express international accords.”286 
E. Balancing the Cited Sources of Customary International Law 
As the Flores court noted, with variety of potential sources suggested by 
the International Court of Justice Statute, there is a risk of “creative 
interpretation.”287  The majority and dissenting opinions in Abdullahi 
exemplify the potential for interpretive license.  While both agreed that 
customary international law “does not stem from any single, definitive, 
readily identifiable source,” they arrived at differing conclusions after 
examining the same instruments.288 
In order to minimize this risk, the Second Circuit historically has “in [its] 
cases, methodically assessed the weight and relative influence of not only 
 
 281. Only twenty-seven countries are members of the European Union.  See The Member 
Countries of the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/member-countries/ 
index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).  Although many of these nations enjoy great 
influence, they represent just a fraction of the rest of the world’s nations. 
 282. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2010). 
 283. See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-50.56 (Part 50, as a whole, provides the regulations 
for the protection of human subjects.). 
 284. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 182 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 285. Id. at 198 (citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 
2003)). 
 286. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 287. See Flores, 414 F.3d at 248-51. 
 288. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 176, 202 (citing Flores, 414 F.3d at 248). 
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each class of sources listed in the [International Court of Justice] Statute, but 
many individual sources within each class.”289  The broad differences in the 
analytical approaches taken by the majority and dissent become evident 
when considering this “methodical assessment” of probative value.  Here, 
the majority wove together the salient aspects of eight different purported 
sources of international law to find the existence of a norm against non-
consensual medical research.290  The dissent took a stricter approach, 
reasoning that the “great weight of ATS jurisdiction must rest upon a 
foundation [that is] sturdy enough to support it.”291 
V.  CRITIQUING THE ABDULLAHI COURT’S ANALYSIS OF WHETHER PFIZER’S ALLEGED 
NON-CONSENUSAL MEDICAL RESEARCH FALLS WITHIN THE “LAW OF NATIONS” 
At this point, it is valuable to analyze more fully the “law of nations” 
component of the ATS, as well as its attendant state action inquiry.  With a 
broader understanding of these elements, one can see some of the more 
troubling implications of the Abdullahi court’s interpretation of the ATS. 
A. The “Law of Nations” 
Although Sosa articulated a broad standard for determining a customary 
international norm (that it be sufficiently specific, universal, and 
obligatory),292 there is still much question as to where a court should look in 
order to find the “law of nations.”  As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law notes, “[c]ustomary international law has developed slowly 
and unevenly . . . [N]ational courts required to determine questions of 
international law must do so by imprecise methods out of uncertain 
materials . . . .”293  Moreover, the utility of any source depends heavily on 
the facts pled in an individual complaint.294  As a result, when thinking 
broadly about the “law of nations” it is perhaps more important to identify 
 
 289. Id. at 194 (Wesley, J., dissenting).  These classes of sources will be discussed in 
greater detail.  See infra Part V.A.  They are only mentioned now to illustrate the difference in 
the majority’s and minority’s approaches to balancing the weight of the evidence. 
 290. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 175-88 (majority opinion). 
 291. Id. at 202 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
 292. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
 293. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: INTRODUCTORY NOTE (1987). 
 294. ATS plaintiffs have, for example, relied upon treaties that were not ratified at the time 
the cause of action arose and provisions of international accords that were not directly on 
point.  For example, in Vietnam Ass’n, the plaintiff attempted to rely on a Protocol that had not 
been ratified until after the cause of action accrued and on an advisory opinion that the court 
characterized as “not on point.”  See Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 119-24 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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the kinds of authorities that provide “competent proof of . . . customary 
international law”295 than any specific, individual authority. 
When undertaking to determine the law of nations, courts have 
frequently looked to Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statutes 
(ICJS).296 Article 38 declares four sources that should be applied when 
deciding questions “in accordance with international law.”297  The sources 
are: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.298 
Section 103 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law similarly 
provides that “[i]n determining whether a rule has become international law, 
substantial weight is accorded to: 
a. judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral tribunals; 
b. judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals; 
c. the writings of scholars; 
d. pronouncements by states that undertake to state a rule of international 
law, when such pronouncements are not seriously challenged by other 
states.”299 
The general classes of international law sources articulated in the ICJS 
and Restatement assist in weighing the probative value of individual sources 
put forth by plaintiffs as evidentiary of a norm of customary international 
law.  Once a court can determine whether a source fits into one of these 
categories, it is in a position to determine whether the source might be 
evidentiary of the state of international law and, if so, to what extent. 
While using the ICJS and Restatement to categorize sources is a good 
starting point, it certainly will not be determinative of a source’s applicability.  
 
 295. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 251 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 296. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJS].  For example, the Second Circuit has cited Article 38 in 
Flores (Flores, 414 F.3d at 250-51) and Yousef  (United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 100-
01 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 297. ICJS, supra note 296. 
 298. Id. 
 299. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 103 (1987). 
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A good example of this can be found in the 2009 decision, where the 
plaintiffs relied upon—and the majority accepted—the Nuremberg Code as 
a source of international law evidencing a norm of customary international 
law prohibiting nonconsensual medical testing.300  As the dissent noted, 
however, the Code does not fit technically into any of the ICJS categories.301  
It does intuitively seem, though, that it might carry some weight in specific 
factual situations—such as if a plaintiff alleged forcible experimentation by a 
regime during wartime. 
Section 102 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law is also 
instructive when thinking broadly about the law of nations.302  In pertinent 
part, it provides that “[a] rule of international law is one that has been 
accepted as such by the international community of states (a) in the form of 
customary law; (b) by international agreement; or (c) by derivation from 
general principles common to the major legal systems of the world.”303  It 
also states that, under certain circumstances, “[i]nternational 
agreements . . . may lead to the creation of customary international law” 
and that “[g]eneral principles common to the major legal systems . . . may 
be invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate” 
(emphasis added).304 
It is valuable to note that while the Restatement provides solid guidelines 
for proving international norms of customary law, it is not as persuasive as 
the ICJS because it, in itself, does not constitute a statement of universally 
recognized principles of international law: “at most . . ., the Restatement 
iterates the existing U.S. view of the law of nations . . . .”305  This highlights 
yet again how difficult it is to categorize a source of international law, 
determine its weight relative to other related sources, and ultimately 
determine that it, either alone or in combination with other materials, 
demonstrates a norm of customary international law. 
The expansiveness of the law of nations inquiry can be somewhat 
daunting, but it is important to remember that Sosa emphasized a need for 
judicial restraint and left the door to new causes of action “still ajar” and 
“subject to vigilant doorkeeping.”306  Indeed, this view represents the liberal 
end of the spectrum, as Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
 
 300. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 179-84 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 301. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 198-202 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
 302. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 306. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004). 
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Justice Thomas) argued that the door to new causes of action should be 
shut altogether.307 
Taken together, this would tend to support a more conservative view of 
the law of nations as a whole and a healthy skepticism of the evidentiary 
value of the ATS plaintiffs’ proffered “sources” of international law.  In 
Abdullahi, the majority seemed to take an overly expansive view of the law 
of nations, picking and choosing relevant bits of a number of sources and 
declaring that they, collectively, demonstrate a customary international norm 
against nonconsensual medical research.308  The dissent, on the other hand, 
conducted an analysis closer to that of the District Court in Abdullahi III, 
disfavoring instruments to which the United States is not party and 
aspirational declarations of non-governmental bodies.309  While it is 
arguable that the dissent dispensed with sources that may have been 
probative in combination with a number of others, it does not appear that 
Judge Wesley threw out anything that plainly and convincingly evidenced the 
customary norm of international law at issue.310  The majority, however, 
included instruments that clearly should not carry any evidentiary value; 
among other things, it accepted at least two sources that post-dated the 
initiation of the Abdullahi litigation.311 
Looking only at the law of nations inquiry and disregarding the 
important, intertwined issue of whether Pfizer is a state or private actor, the 
Abdullahi decision seems to clearly represent an expansion of the ATS that 
was not contemplated by the First Congress and exceeds the limited judicial 
discretion to determine private causes of action from the law of nations that 
Sosa so cautiously granted.312 
C. The State Action Consideration 
The state action component is a major consideration when determining 
whether cases involving private actor defendants can be brought 
appropriately under the ATS; without demonstrable government involvement 
or a delegation of authority to a private actor by a government, the ATS will 
not extend jurisdiction to a case brought against a private actor313 (such as 
a corporation like Pfizer).  Although the majority did not afford it much 
 
 307. Id. at 739, 744-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).  “Federal common law is a new door 
[and] [t]he question is not whether that door will be left ajar, but whether this court will open 
it.”  See id. at 746. 
 308. See supra Part IV.A. 
 309. See supra Part IV.C (focusing on the paragraphs discussing the dissenting opinion). 
 310. See supra Part IV.C (focusing on the paragraphs discussing the dissenting opinion). 
 311. See supra Part IV.C (focusing on the paragraphs discussing the majority opinion). 
 312. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the perceived intent of the ATS drafters within the 
Sosa opinion). 
 313. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Kadic and the state action component). 
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analysis, a good deal of the Abdullahi decision necessarily rests upon the 
issue of whether Pfizer is or is not a state actor.  The “norm against 
nonconsensual medical testing” cannot be found as easily for private actors 
as for state actors.314 
Section 404 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states 
the following violations of international law for which private parties may be 
held liable: “[acts] such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of 
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of 
terrorism . . . .”315  On the other hand, the § 702 of the Restatement 
provides that 
[a] state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, 
encourages, or condones  (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the 
murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged 
arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent 
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.316 
Kadic noted that although the categories of private and state actor violations 
may overlap, they are not coterminous.317  Clearly, the list of violations for 
which a state actor may be held liable is much longer than the 
corresponding list for private actors.  A court may not draw from the state 
actor list to find liability against a private actor.318 
In looking at these lists, it is clear that performing nonconsensual 
medical research does not fall within the classes of actions for which private 
actors can be held liable.  As to the state actions list, it is possible that one 
could argue that nonconsensual medical research either falls under “torture 
or other, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” or “a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights.”319  With respect to the former, it is not particularly clear that Pfizer’s 
actions fit neatly within this category.  Although it is reproachable to fail to 
obtain informed consent, it is questionable whether Pfizer’s Trovan trial 
constituted “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”320  The latter category 
 
 314. See infra notes 315-18. 
 315. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987) (noting that jurisdiction 
does not apply to state actors only). 
 316. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987). 
 317. See Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 318. See id. 
 319. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 320. This certainly does not suggest that nonconsensual medical research itself does not 
fall into this category.  It is unclear in this particular case that Pfizer was acting to torture or 
degrade the Trovan subjects; its research protocol was undoubtedly lacking, but arguably it 
does not rise to the level of atrocity contemplated in the Restatement.  Trovan was 
administered to individuals who were indeed suffering from the disease the drug was designed 
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requires the showing of “a consistent pattern of gross violations . . .”—
something that may not be satisfied by the one-time Trovan trial—and a 
demonstration of the state of “internationally recognized human rights.”321  
This effectively circles back to the law of nations inquiry and requires an 
analysis of relevant sources of international law. 
Plainly, the Restatement § 404 (adopted by the Second Circuit in Kadic) 
does not contemplate a cause of action against Pfizer as a private actor for 
violating a customary international norm against nonconsensual medical 
research.322  Therefore, it was critical that the majority found Pfizer was a 
state actor. 
As discussed in Part IV(B), supra, the Abdullahi majority’s analysis of the 
state action component was slipshod at best.  It included unsubstantiated 
facts that were not within the scope of appellate review and was largely 
devoid of meaningful analysis.323  The negligible portion of the opinion 
dedicated to Pfizer’s status looked like a mere formality324 and suggested 
that perhaps the court, desiring to bring Pfizer to justice, had glossed over 
the private actor possibility. 
The Sosa Court did not have occasion to examine the state action 
component of the law of nations.325  This is not because it is an unimportant 
part of ATS analysis; rather, the Sosa case plainly involved state action326 so 
the Court did not reach that element.  However, the hesitancy of the Sosa 
Court to expand the ATS too greatly327 seems to suggest that the Supreme 
Court would counsel against a liberal analysis of the state action component 
in order to keep ATS liability firmly constrained.  Disregarding or 
manipulating the state action component will have the undesirable effect of 
“lower[ing] the bar”328 for ATS plaintiffs and the disastrous effect of 
effectively merging the separate lists of actions for which private and state 
 
to treat; it was not administered gratuitously to healthy individuals.  See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 
562 F.3d 163, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 321. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987). 
 322. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987) (noting that 
nonconsensual medical research is not included in the list of punishable actions attributable to 
private actors). 
 323. See supra Part IV.A-B.  See also Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 188-89 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
 324. See supra Part IV.A-B.  See also Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 188-89. 
 325. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28 (2004) (noting the discussion 
concerns private rights of action, not state action). 
 326. Id. at 697-99 (noting that Sosa acted on behalf of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration). 
 327. Id. at 727-28. 
 328. Recent Case, Second Circuit Looks Beyond, supra note 203, at 772 (discussing how 
“procedural evasion of the state action requirement lowers the bar for ATS claim survival 
. . . .”). 
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actors may be held liable.  This ostensibly defies the primary holding of 
Sosa—that the ATS does not create new causes of action.329 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The ATS has a long, inconsistent, and controversial history—particularly 
with respect to the law of nations element and related state action inquiry.  
Although a great deal of ambiguity remains, Sosa has provided some 
guidance as to the breadth of the statute, how the law of nations may be 
determined, and the requirements for a customary norm of international law 
to provide a private cause of action.  In particular, Sosa emphasized a need 
for judicial restraint and left the door to new causes of action “only slightly 
ajar” and “subject to vigilant doorkeeping.” 
With respect to the law of nations, the Abdullahi decision seems to 
clearly represent an expansion of the ATS that was not contemplated by the 
First Congress and exceeds the limited judicial discretion to determine 
private causes of action from the law of nations that the Sosa court so 
cautiously granted.  The majority cobbled together various provisions of 
purported sources of international law (some of which were plainly 
inapplicable) to find that there exists a customary international norm against 
nonconsensual medical research for which the plaintiffs had a private right 
of action. 
This finding was even more skewed by the fact that the majority glossed 
over the state action component, failing to entertain the very plausible 
notion that Pfizer is a private, rather than state actor.330  Indeed, some of the 
sources relied upon apply explicitly and exclusively to state actors.  Such 
inadequate consideration of the state action component can lead to 
disastrous expansion of ATS jurisdiction.331  In particular, it opens the door 
 
 329. Id. (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727). 
 330. One year after Abdullahi was decided, the Second Circuit held that ATS jurisdiction 
does not extend to claims against corporations, finding that “although customary international 
law has sometimes extended the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to 
individuals, it has never extended the scope of liability to a corporation.”  Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2010).  The court cautioned, however, “nothing in 
this opinion limits or forecloses suits under the ATS against the individual perpetrators of 
violations of customary international law—including the employees, managers, officers, and 
directors of a corporation . . . .”  Id. at 122.  Thus, while suits in the Second Circuit can no 
longer proceed against private pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer, plaintiffs may sue 
individually those within the company who allegedly assist or engage in behavior violative of 
the law of nations.  Although this resolves Abdullahi’s unanswered question of whether 
corporate liability is possible under the ATS, it does nothing to curb courts’ willingness to 
“find” state action based on a thin factual record.  The danger still exists that courts will name 
corporate directors or researchers as “state actors” as a basis for individual liability. 
 331. For example, in its summation of the case, the Harvard Law Review staff noted 
“evasion of the state action requirement endangers the executive’s power to conduct foreign 
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to ATS litigation over private violations of international customary norms that 
ought only be enforceable (for ATS purposes) against state actors.  This is 
especially true with respect to nonconsensual medical research—absent 
appreciable state involvement, the ATS should not be a jurisdictional basis 
for foreign claims against private pharmaceutical companies or their 
employees. 
Overall, the Abdullahi majority disregarded Sosa and applied the ATS 
over-broadly, more or less kicking down the door that the Sosa court 
cautioned was barely ajar.  Without curtailing this brand of liberal ATS 
interpretation, federal courts could be faced with problematic effects of an 
ill-advised, unintended expansion of the ATS. 
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affairs . . . .  [Courts] risk blaming the foreign government even when the foreign government 
had little role at all.”  Recent Case, Second Circuit Looks Beyond, supra note 203 (citing Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28 (2004)). 
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